

# My KDFAES Walkabout

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# About Joel Tilton

- Joel Tilton is a former employee of IBM, where he got his start with mainframes, who continues to champion mainframe security issues and solutions.
- Over 20+ years technical IT experience, the majority of which was gained in hands-on technical roles, performing a variety of duties in diverse and complex environments.
- The majority of Joel's experience is focused on IBM mainframe systems, where he performs as a Technician and Project Manager. Joel's specialist subject is IT Security, in particular z/OS and associated subsystems (CICS, DB2, MQ, zSecure, etc.) security with RACF.
- Joel is also an active member of the Tampa Bay RUG (RACF User Group) which meets jointly with the NY RUG. Joel has a true passion for security and the mainframe. Long live the mainframe!
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# Disclaimers

- All products, trademarks, and information mentioned are the property of the respective vendors.
- Mention of a product does not imply a recommendation.
- Always test new profiles on a non-production system.
- Only you can prevent IPLs...
- The views expressed are his own personal views, and are not endorsed or supported by, and do not necessarily express or reflect, the views, positions or strategies of his employer



# Where to begin?

- RTFM
  - Read That Fine Manual!
- APAR OA43999 Doc
- Informational APAR
- RACF System Programmer's Guide
- RACF Security Administrator's Guide
- Redbook???

The journey of a  
thousand miles  
begins with a  
single step.

(Lao Tzu)

# In the Beginning, there was Masking

- As the name *mask* implies it is very weak
- Validate no UserIDs have a masked value
  - z/OS 2.2 REQUIREMENT
  - Converting to KDFAES solves this problem
- Ideally ICHDEX01 is set to RC 08
- Use ICHPSOUT with PARM=DES
  - Attempts to de-mask a password before doing a DES encrypt operation
  - Writes error message if de-mask value contains any invalid password characters
  - DES encrypted password run through de-masking has a very high change of not having valid chars

# Then Later, there was DES

- And the Data Encryption Standard was good...
- But as computing technology improved so did password cracking programs. Ugh!
- APAR OA43999 – RACF Password Security Enhancements
  - November 3<sup>rd</sup> 2014 Initial version
  - <ftp://public.dhe.ibm.com/s390/zos/racf/pdf/oa43999.pdf>
- Since when does shelf life of a PTF guarantee it is bug free?

# Planning

- Biggest Issues:
  - Does Installed Software Support AES?
  - PTFs
- **II14765: SUPPORT INFORMATION REGARDING RACF PASSWORD SECURITY ENHANCEMENTS OA43998 AND OA43999**
  - <http://www-01.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=isg1II14765>
- NetView FTP does not support the KDFAES encryption algorithm if the parameters SSECURP=('\*', '\*') and/or RSECURP=('\*', '\*') are used

# Some Statistics

- Because everybody loves numbers...
- For 1k ALTUSER commands
  - Minimal Increase of 30 TCB seconds measured
- Why ALTUSER ?
- Does not VLF cache
- Every command costs full crypto overhead
- Good baseline measurement



# PTF Highlights

- APAR OA43998 (SAF) & OA43999 (RACF)
- Two fix categories to track service updates
  - Run REPORT MISSINGFIX for Fix Categories
  - IBM.Function.RACF.PasswordCharacters
  - IBM.Function.RACF.PasswordEncryption
- zVM 6.3 support for KDFAES available with VM65719
- CICS 5.1 initial support [PI21866](#)
  - Additional Fixes: [PI33454](#) & [PI39336](#)
- CICS 4.2 initial support [PI21865](#)
  - Additional Fixes: [PI33451](#) & [PI44380](#)

# Critical Planning Info

- PTFs Rollout ASAP ← Critical Path
- Enable VLF Caching ← Hard Requirement
  - The first logon of the day costs the most
- Plan for the size of the RACF DB to increase
  - AES encryption requires more physical space
  - Size of password and each password history entry more than doubles
  - In my testing a regularly reorganized DB at 48% used space increased to 53%
  - After “full” conversion
    - Full = password & password histories e.g. ALU PWCONVERT

# CPACF REQUIRED

- Central Processor Assist for Cryptographic Functions
  - Accelerates the AES hashing functions
- Every mainframe “most likely” already has this on or you would have serious performance issues but...
- “Trust but Verify”
- Have your favorite sysprog that owes you a favor check the HMC (Hardware Management Console) 😊
- Check the output in the ICSF Address Space:
  - CSFM126I CRYPTOGRAPHY - FULL CPU-BASED SERVICES ARE AVAILABLE.
- REMINDER: ICSF must come up before PAGENT (AT TLS) or hardware acceleration will not be used

# A Quick Word about ICSF & CPACF

- Both are independent of the other
- CPACF is a hardware feature enabled at HMC
- ICSF (Integrated Cryptographic Services Facility) accelerates encrypt/decrypt operations via CyptoExpress Cards
- You do not have to run ICSF address space to make CPACF available



# ICSF Performance Improvement

- XFACILIT UACC(NONE) AUDIT(NONE)
  - They simply need to exist
- CSF.CSFSERV.AUTH.CSFOWH.DISABLE
  - Bypass SAF call for CSFSERV CSFOWH profile (one way hash)
- CSF.CSFSERV.AUTH.CSFRNG.DISABLE
  - Bypass SAF class for CSFSERV CSFRNG profile (random number generation)
- Example: SFTP, CSFOWH called for every packet sent & received! Uffda...
- Requires HCR77A1 release of ICSF at a minimum
  
- CSFM650I CSFSERV AUTHORIZATION CHECK FOR RANDOM NUMBER GENERATE SERVICES IS DISABLED
  
- CSFM650I CSFSERV AUTHORIZATION CHECK FOR ONE-WAY HASH SERVICES IS DISABLED

# VLF Caching **REQUIRED**

- Did I mention VLF caching is **REQUIRED**
- First logon of the day costs
- SYS1.PARMLIB(COFVLFxx)
- CLASS NAME(IRRACEE) EMAJ(ACEE)
  - Cache ACEE in storage
- CLASS NAME(IRRGTS) EMAJ(GTS)
  - Cache RACF Group Tree

# VLF Cache UNIX Related Info

- `SYS1.PARMLIB(COFVLFxx)`
- Cache UID & GID information too
  - `CLASS NAME(IRRUMAP) EMAJ(UMAP)`
  - `CLASS NAME(IRRGMAP) EMAJ(GMAP)`
  - `CLASS NAME(IRRSMAP) EMAJ(SMAP)`

# To Convert or Not Convert

- Option 1 ← Because Your Mileage May Vary
  - SETR PASSWORD(ALGORITHM(KDFAES))
  - Wait for passwords to convert as time marches on
  - Do you have the time to wait?
- Option 2 ← Recommended
  - SETR PASSWORD(ALGORITHM(KDFAES))
  - ALU UserID PWCONVERT
    - Convert all password history entries up front



# Passphrase Considerations

- ALU UserID PWCONVRT
  - Password Conversion Only
- How to convert a passphrase?
  - Change the password! ☹️
- Suggested Strategy
  - ALU UserID NOPASSWORD
  - ALU UserID PWCLEAN
  - ALU UserID Phrase('myLongPasswordPhrase')

# Backup Considerations

- Hopefully everyone is backing up their RACF DB nightly!!!
  - GDG limit 255
  - Why not, if it migrates anyway thanks to HSM
  - Modern VTS offers MIGRAT2 @ MIGRAT1 speeds!
  - Set course for fast recovery of tape,
    - Warp factor 9 Engage!
- A Strategy
  - Using zSecure backup all DES encrypted password values **BEFORE** you convert to KDFAES
  - CKGRACF → APF authorized, TSO Authorized Command
    - Manipulate fields previously out of reach with RACF commands
      - LJDATE, LJTIME, previous & current password
    - Controlled by CKG.\*\* in XFACILIT
- If *something* goes bump, then line item restore just that password



# May I have this RINARY Dance?

- Another strategy...
- If you have password issues turn off KDFAES
- SETR PASSWORD(*NOALGORITHM*)
- Restore from the prior copy of the RACF DB
  - Issue: Now you have to forward recover any work you've done since the backup was taken
  - Ouch!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
- Or issue ALU UserID EXPIRE to force the person to go back to a DES password
  - Not practical for non human IDs e.g. servers etc.

# Helpful KDFAES features

- If you must turn off KDFAES
- SETR PASSWORD(*NOALGORITHM*)
- AES encrypted password histories will still evaluate!
  - Golf Clap RACF Development
- For systems using RRSF
  - Mixed Environment is ok
  - Meaning AES and DES encrypted RACF DBs can co-exist and passwords WILL sync.
  - Again Golf Clap RACF Development

# New ALTUSER Keywords

- ALTUSER UserID PWCLEAN
  - Run this as you convert to AES
    - Because we like a squeaky clean RACF DB!
  - Ensure stale password history entries are gone
  - Raise your hand if you remember CUTPWHIS
  - Cost: Minimal time to build commands
- ALTUSER UserID EXPIRE 😊
  - Yes we can finally just expire a password



# IRR401

- IRR410I RACF UNABLE TO BACK UP UPDATE OF xxxx after running ALU PWCONVERT
- This does not mean the RACF DB is corrupted
- To date this is the only technical hiccup I have experienced
- Solution
  - RVARY INACT DATASET(backup dataset name)
  - Sub UT200 job with PARM=ACTIVATE

# Idea!

- So based upon receiving IRR<sub>4101</sub> you could:
- RVAR Y INACT DATASET(backup dataset name)
- Run batch job with ALU UserID PWCONVERT
- Sub UT200 job with PARM=ACTIVATE
- Why?
  - Well since we know about an IRR<sub>4101</sub> potential why not?
  - Batch job with PWCONVERT runs faster without the backup online

# Sample Production DB Stats

Before AES	After AES	Delta	UserIDs
48%	54%	6%	40k+
45%	51%	6%	40k+
37%	44%	7%	35k+

- Not Split
- Plan for RACF DB Size Increase
  - AES Password more than doubles password field
- Recommend reorg after full AES conversion



# zSecure Command Verifier

- You might want to consider defining
- `C4R.RACF.USER.PASSWORD.ALGORITHM`
- `C4R.RACF.USER.PASSWORD.SPECIALCHAR`  
`S`
- `UACC(NONE) AUDIT(ALL(READ))`
- Empty Access List
- Prevent the SETR command until you are ready to implement

# Summary

- Try not. Do...or do not. There is no try!
  - Master Yoda
- How do you tackle any project? One small step at a time...
- Study Info APAR and APAR OA43999 doco
- Get Needed PTFs rolling out ASAP
- Validate CPACF Enabled
- Plan a backout strategy
- Rehearse backout strategy
- Implement
- AES Password Encryption Engage!



# My Thanks To...

- Stu Henderson
- Adam Klinger
- Mark Nelson
- Kevin Shelton
- Hayim Sokolsky
- William Vender
- Bruce Wells
- And the Adventure Continues to Boldly Go Where No Encryption Algorithm Has Gone Before ...

# Questions?



# What is KDFAES

- A stronger encryption algorithm that makes it much harder to brute force attack passwords stored in RACF.
- [https://www.ibm.com/support/knowledgecenter/SSLTBW\\_2.2.0/com.ibm.zos.v2r2.icha200/icha20079.htm](https://www.ibm.com/support/knowledgecenter/SSLTBW_2.2.0/com.ibm.zos.v2r2.icha200/icha20079.htm)

# APAR OA43999 Doc

- <ftp://public.dhe.ibm.com/s390/zos/racf/pdf/oa43999.pdf>

# Planning Docs

- PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
- [https://www.ibm.com/support/knowledgecenter/SSLTBW\\_2.2.0/com.ibm.zos.v2r2.icha200/icha20091a.htm](https://www.ibm.com/support/knowledgecenter/SSLTBW_2.2.0/com.ibm.zos.v2r2.icha200/icha20091a.htm)
- RACF UPDATE Presentation from Mark Nelson
- [ftp://public.dhe.ibm.com/eserver/zseries/zos/racf/pdf/nyrug\\_2014\\_11\\_racf\\_update.pdf](ftp://public.dhe.ibm.com/eserver/zseries/zos/racf/pdf/nyrug_2014_11_racf_update.pdf)

# VLF Caching Doc

- [https://www.ibm.com/support/knowledgecenter/SSLTBW\\_1.13.0/com.ibm.zos.r13.icha200/ichza2co43.htm%23wq178](https://www.ibm.com/support/knowledgecenter/SSLTBW_1.13.0/com.ibm.zos.r13.icha200/ichza2co43.htm%23wq178)
- [https://www.ibm.com/support/knowledgecenter/SSLTBW\\_2.1.0/com.ibm.zos.v2r1.bpxb200/stepcac.htm](https://www.ibm.com/support/knowledgecenter/SSLTBW_2.1.0/com.ibm.zos.v2r1.bpxb200/stepcac.htm)



# CPACF Doc

- [https://www.ibm.com/support/knowledgecenter/linuxonibm/com.ibm.linux.z.wskc.doc/wskc\\_c\\_s02cpacf.html](https://www.ibm.com/support/knowledgecenter/linuxonibm/com.ibm.linux.z.wskc.doc/wskc_c_s02cpacf.html)